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by
Cathy E. Minehan, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Swissôtel, Boston, Massachusetts
June 18, 2001
It's a pleasure to be with
you here at the semi-annual meeting of the Boston Municipal
Research Bureau. As a director, I am extremely proud
of the way the Bureau brings an unbiased, analytical
perspective to the finances and public policy choices
made in Boston. The Bureau's publications are invaluable
in separating the political hype from the real issues.
Moreover, Sam has become a trusted colleague for a lot
of us who try to help find solutions to difficult situations
in the city. Clearly, the Bureau, and Sam have helped
to shape Boston's current healthy status. But I'm sure
he shares my own sense that more than the usual amount
of uncertainty faces the economic outlook for the city,
the region and the nation as we look forward. This uncertainty
will be the focus of my comments today.
It goes without saying that
the last half of the '90s set a standard of economic
performance that is in many ways unparalleled. That
period is critical to understanding where the economy
is currently, and why things seem so uncertain now.
I'd like to highlight the key aspects of that period
for you, and then turn to the present situation in the
nation and New England.
In February 2000, the U.S.
economy set a record for the longest expansion ever
-- that is since 1854, the earliest date for which an
official business cycle date exists. The expansion began
in March 1991, and continues today, as far as we can
tell. As if that weren't enough, rather than gradually
losing momentum through its long lifespan, as most expansions
do, this one gained steam as it aged, posting a blistering
6.1 percent growth rate in its ninth year, from mid-1999
through mid-2000. At the same time, unemployment dropped
to a thirty-year low of less than 4 percent, and, astonishingly,
inflation, measured in many different ways, was at extremely
low levels as well. This combination of growth, low
unemployment, and low inflation had not been seen since
the early '60s, and, frankly, some thought it wasn't
possible.
What caused this good fortune?
Well, many things contributed, such as extremely low
oil costs, excess world capacity for much of the '97-99
period, and a growing U.S. fiscal surplus, which helped
to keep interest rates low. But as we look back on the
period, one aspect of the economy during that time seems
most significant--rising productivity.
As you all know, the rate
of productivity growth in an economy--that is, how much
can be produced with given resources at a point in time--determines--at
least over longer time horizons--how fast standards
of living--and real incomes--will rise. It is an unequivocally
good thing. If the rate of productivity growth doubles--as
it did from '96-2000 versus the previous 3 decades--then
standards of living can double in about half the time.
Productivity can fluctuate
significantly with the business cycle, rising when demand
is high, just as all of us can work harder and produce
more over short periods of time, and falling when demand
falls and employers find it hard to downsize to keep
pace with the slowdown. This type of productivity variability
is cyclical by definition and short-term. But productivity
also can be affected by permanent changes in how efficiently
the economy works--for example, through changes in the
level and use of technology, or through a better-educated
workforce. These so-called "structural" productivity
changes are hard to separate from cyclical variations,
but they are critical to rising economic fortunes over
time.
Undoubtedly, some of the growth
in productivity in the last half of the '90s was cyclical--particularly
the spectacular growth rates of 1999. But some appears
to have been structural as well, driven both by capital
deepening and by the sheer desire of U.S. business to
work harder and smarter in the face of global competition.
In the five years from 1996 to 2000, the economy grew
at an annual pace of 4.3 percent, and productivity averaged
2.9 percent. During the same period, investment in equipment
and software grew over 24 percent annually, and investment
in computers and peripheral equipment grew by more than
40 percent. Even allowing for the more rapid depreciation
rate of the high-tech equipment in which firms invested
during this period, that pace of investment implied
that businesses added nearly 7% to the capital stock
of U.S. firms in 1999 alone, the last year for which
data are available. This annual rate of net capital
formation was nearly double that of the period of 1990-98,
and appears to have played a key role in businesses'
ability to meet growing demands while keeping prices
in check.
Rising productivity had other
related effects as well. Consumers became increasingly
optimistic about the future, spent more on big-ticket
items like cars and houses and saved less. Asset markets
reflected this optimism and soared, particularly in
high-tech areas. And investors in other countries reacted
as well, pouring money into U.S. markets, strengthening
the dollar and financing the external deficit caused
by exuberant U.S. consumers.
But this sort of economic
bliss can last only so long. Sooner or later the stress
on resources brings problems. One indication of this
was the gradual decline in the unemployment rate over
the period--to a point where labor market tightness
became a constraint on growth. Even in the face of huge
productivity increases, demand was outstripping supply.
In recognition of this, the
Fed began tightening policy in the second half of 1999,
hoping to bring demand and supply back into a more sustainable
balance. But at the same time a number of other, arguably
more potent, impediments to economic growth appeared.
After a period of extremely low energy costs, prices
rose significantly in 1999 and 2000--and not just oil
prices, but natural gas, electricity, and gasoline.
Developments in these energy markets are, of course,
closely related, as natural gas is a primary fuel for
electric generators, and is also used extensively in
home heating. These energy price increases acted as
a tax not only on consumers, but also on businesses
whose rising energy costs took a chunk out of profits.
Financial markets reacted
to the sense of unsustainability in the economy as well.
Spreads widened in the spring of 2000 and then again
in the fall, and the bloom came off the rose of the
dot.com miracle. Equity price declines took almost $3
trillion out of consumers pockets--or what they may
have assumed was in their pockets at the height of the
market--and declining equity markets had a hand in slowing
business spending as well.
Finally, it is arguable that
after a four-year spending spree, consumers and businesses
reached a point of satiation. Consumers owned all the
cars, houses, and durable goods they could use; businesses
had acquired enough capital goods, particularly in the
face of slowing demand. Spending rates slowed, in some
industries drastically. High-tech businesses, even those
with long successful track records, reported the slowdown
was unprecedently fast and hard--like running into a
wall at 60 miles an hour, to quote one contact. Over
the year 2000, GDP growth slipped from a strong 5+ percent
pace in the first half, to a 1 percent run rate by year-end,
and spending on high-tech equipment and software dropped.
Likely not a recession, our Bank's forecasts tell us,
but to those most seriously affected--the manufacturing
sector especially--it sure feels like one.
So where are we now, and where
are we going? These are not easy questions to answer.
Over the longer term, I have confidence that the determination
of U.S. businesses to be ever more competitive, combined
with and facilitated by the use of new technology, bodes
well for continued solid productivity growth. But on
the way to the long term, one has to get through the
short run. And right now--this quarter--there is a distinct
pause in firms' willingness to spend on the capital
equipment. Orders for equipment are off, industrial
production has declined for a remarkable 8 months, and
manufacturing capacity utilization is at its lowest
point since 1983. Businesses are waiting to see clear
signs that demand for their products has returned; I
believe that will occur, but it's hard to see the turnaround
in the data as yet.
Obviously this has affected
employment decisions as well. Firms may well be both
holding on to labor that only a few months ago was in
extremely short supply, and avoiding making the long-term
investment in a new hire as well. Indeed, many manufacturing
firms, who have been hit the worst in this slowdown,
have cut back on temporary hiring. In addition, the
rest of the world, including our key trading partners,
is slowing, in large part because U.S. demand was driving
foreign growth as well as our own. While the foreign
slowdown may be less than our own, foreign demand is
not likely to provide a boost to U.S. output in the
near term. The ace-in-the-hole so far has been the consumer.
Real consumption spending has held up fairly well, growing
just under 3 percent for the two most recent quarters.
In large part, motor vehicle manufacturers were able
to trim outsized inventories late last year because
sales were so strong in the first quarter of this year.
To be sure, some of the sales were supported by manufacturers'
incentives in the form of rebates and low financing
rates. But in times of recession, even rebates and cheap
financing lose their appeal. So far, apparently, consumers
have not moved into recession mode.
Consistent with this picture
of consumers' relatively healthy attitudes, construction
of new homes has held up quite well. Through April,
new home building continued near the rates that set
records in 1998 and 1999. I don't expect fantastic growth
in housing construction. But again, the willingness
of so many households to make this largest of investments
is an encouraging sign.
If labor markets remain relatively
solid, recent developments in fiscal policy may keep
the consumer in a buying mood. The combination of tax
rebates, and reduced tax rates, that are included in
the Administration's recently approved tax plan should
boost consumption, beginning in the third quarter of
this year. The Treasury is scheduled to mail rebate
checks, up to $300 per single filer, and up to $600
for a joint return, beginning in August. Over 90 million
checks will be mailed. As you may know, normally the
Treasury uses electronic means to make its payments.
For a variety of reasons this can't happen for this
rebate. Thus, the Treasury--and the Reserve Banks as
well--will have some gearing up to do to get this job
done.
What will consumers do with
this relatively small windfall? Historical experience
with tax rebates suggests that consumers will spend
about half, and either save or pay off debt with the
rest. If the split is 50/50, this would add between
one-half and three-fourths percentage point to GDP growth,
likely split between the latter half of the third quarter
and the first half of the fourth. The tax rate reduction
portion of the tax plan is, of course, more long lasting
than the rebate, but will take some time to kick in.
Essentially all of the effect of the rate cuts will
show up in 2002, again adding one-half to three-fourths
percentage point to GDP.
Going forward, the continued
resilience of the consumer is key to keeping the economy
growing. This is not without its risks. On the one hand,
the savings rate is very low at least for consumers
in the top half of the income distribution, in part
because earlier in the expansion, capital gains in equity
markets substituted for more conventional forms of saving.
This former source of savings is not so abundant now,
raising the risk of consumer retrenchment. Similarly,
demand for autos and other consumer durables may not
remain at its current relatively robust level, particularly
in the face of job uncertainties. On the other hand,
gains in house prices continue and remain a significant
source of wealth for many households--in fact, a good
deal more than those who experienced the surge in equity
wealth in the late '90s.
I mentioned at the beginning
of my remarks that this is a period of considerable
uncertainty. It may be that the drop in business spending
has leveled off, and that in the face of continuing
consumer demand, the over-investment problem may gradually
abate allowing businesses to grow into existing capacity
and resume investment in new technologies. This could
take time, however. The Federal Reserve has eased policy
rapidly over the past five months, and overnight rates
are now a full 2.5 percentage points lower than they
were on January 1. Moreover, much of the impact of this
easing will be felt in the latter part of this year,
possibly providing a boost along with the fiscal stimulus
just when other parts of the economy may be turning
up. The consensus forecast continues to see a pick up
in the latter part of the year and I think there is
a good chance this is what will happen. But this is
by no means a certain outcome, and the preponderance
of current economic data suggests that in the short
run, downside risks are real.
Looking beyond the current
period, however, longer-run questions are key. These
are questions to which I don't have answers, but they
also shape my heightened sense of uncertainty. How does
the central bank know how much is enough? Is the monetary
stimulus already in the pipeline sufficient, or is more
needed to ensure recovery? Current real overnight interest
rates are below normal averages, and below many assessments
of the long-run equilibrium. But are these rates low
enough, given demand conditions? Finally, when the economy
does turn around, will inflation be the worry? Recent
increases in employer compensation coupled with slower
productivity growth have produced more rapid growth
in unit labor costs. Headline inflation, however, has
been relatively moderate lately, absent the impact of
increases in energy costs, which are expected to be
transitory. But further down the road, as the economy
retraces its steps back to its long-term rate of growth,
this may become a concern that needs to be addressed.
The national economy has been
facing uncertainty in the face of slow growth, manufacturing
retrenchment, and reliance on a consumer stressed by
job questions for some time. New England generally,
and Massachusetts specifically, however, are only now
beginning to experience these problems. This region
has been healthier longer than most of the rest of the
nation, in part, because it is so diversified and, in
part, because it is not a primary home of industries
hardest hit by the decline initially--namely automobiles
and steel. However, both New England and Massachusetts
have a large, high-tech manufacturing base and the longer
the high-tech slump lasts, the harder the region may
be hit. To date, incoming data on local jobs suggest
the region is holding its own, but there are worrisome
signs as well.
From April 2000 to April 2001,
payroll employment in New England grew more than twice
as fast as the U.S. as a whole. Massachusetts's growth
was even faster, especially in construction employment.
Services also grew faster in the state than in the nation,
while manufacturing employment declined less rapidly.
However, various indicators
suggest that the demand for workers is softening. Nationally,
help wanted advertising has fallen sharply over the
past year. The New England data are much more erratic;
but if one smoothes through the ups and downs, they
too seem to be trending down. The help wanted index
measures the number of want ads in newspapers; as businesses
have done more of their advertising for workers over
the Internet, this index has become a less useful measure
of the number of job vacancies. Accordingly, one of
our economists has begun to follow data from a company,
Flipdog, which compiles data on the number of online
job listings, scaled by the size of the labor force.
On-line advertising is apparently quite popular in New
England, especially in Massachusetts. The volume of
on-line advertising in Massachusetts is higher than
in any other state. However, after rising rapidly over
the course of 2000, on-line advertising in Massachusetts
has fallen sharply since December.
More revealing, perhaps, initial
unemployment claims have started to increase in New
England and the unemployment rate has edged up. The
unemployment rate is still extremely low - just 3.0
percent for the region in April and 3.2 percent for
Massachusetts, but it is higher than a year ago both
for the state and for Boston.
As you may know, Reserve Banks
conduct informal surveys of businesses in their Districts
in order to gather a more timely picture of the economy
than is available from statistical information. The
"Beigebook", as the compilation of write-ups from the
12 Reserve Banks is called, also provides businesses'
interpretations of economic events. At times, the Beigebook
can be quite revealing, and I think that is the case
at present.
Our staff in Boston was quite
surprised by the pessimistic tone of their conversations
with New England businesses. The situation at the end
of May, when these conversations were held, was quite
different from that six weeks earlier. Business was
reported to be flat to down compared to a year earlier
and our contacts were nervous about the outlook. They
do not know when to expect an upturn.
Among manufacturers, two-thirds
of our contacts reported that business is the same as
a year ago, one-third reported sizable decreases. They
have instituted aggressive cost-cutting programs, involving
layoffs, shortened workweeks, and plant shut downs.
Personnel supply firms have been particularly hard hit,
with business off on the order of 20 percent from a
year ago. Demand for IT workers has fallen very sharply.
One contact at a personnel supply firm said that the
change had happened at "Internet speed". He claimed
that companies were importing workers from India a few
months ago, and are now sending the workers back. A
number of software houses have also experienced a sharp
slowing in demand. Both the software providers and some
of the personnel supply firms identified cost-saving
efforts on the part of large firms as responsible for
the slowing. Big national companies that had been growing
rapidly and accounting for an important share of these
firms' business activity are now hunkering down. Thus,
while the statistics indicate that the New England economy
is currently performing better than the national economy,
it is clear that the region is vulnerable to the same
problems as the nation and further, that these problems
continue to ripple out. As we look forward, the best
bet is that the region's performance over the next year
or so will closely mirror that of the nation.
Conclusion
In closing, let me say that
I am guardedly optimistic that the consensus forecast
is a good one. That is, starting in the second half
growth will pick up in both the region and the nation.
The economy has slowed from a very high pace of activity
and some time is needed to absorb the excesses that
period of growth engendered. Downside risks exist to
be sure, but both monetary and fiscal policy makers
are focused on addressing those risks, and shaping the
environment for a resumption in sustainable growth.
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